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COMMENTS
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL
DISHONOR
The measure of damages for a debtor's failure to pay a liquidated sum is
the amount owed plus interest.1 Although the relationship of a bank to its
depositors is that of debtor and creditor, this rule is seldom applied in an
action by the depositor arising out of a bank's failure to pay to his order. In
the recent California case of Abramowitz v. Bank of America2 it was held that
the statute defining tort damages provided the proper measure of recovery in
such an action.3 The question of how such a discrepancy in the measure of
damages came to be and the reasons for the discrepancy form the subject
matter of this comment.
In the Abramowitz case the action was for damages sustained because
plaintiff's check, representing the monthly installment on his car, was wrong-
fully dishonored, resulting in the repossession and sale of the car. The court
upheld a recovery of $731.80 plus interest saying that if he had asked for it
plaintiff could have received $1,600, the full resale value of the car.4 The
court justified its departure from the existing liquidated damages rule,5 by
'5 Williston, Contracts § 1410 (rev. ed., 1937).
2131 Cal. App. 2d 892, 281 P. 2d 380 (Super. Ct., 1955).
' "For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages,
except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which will compen-
sate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been antici-
pated or not." Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) § 3333.
'The $731.80 was found by adding the sum of the plaintiff's previous payments ($935.00)
to the difference between what he still owed ($2,196.80) and the amount realized on the
re-sale ($1,600.00), and taking from this the $800.00 which represented his estimated en-
joyment of the car. The defendant argued that since the market value of the car was less
than the plaintiff still owed, that the plaintiff had suffered no harm. The court answered
that the plaintiff could have recovered the full market value of the car since he was still
liable over to the dealer.
'This was the holding of Hartford v. All Night & Day Bank, 170 Cal. 538, 150 Pac. 356
(1915). In that case the plaintiff had been arrested following the dishonor of his check. He
claimed that the bank's negligence was the proximate cause of his arrest. The court held
against him on three counts: (1) the facts did not support the charge of negligence, (2) the
action was governed by the statute limiting damages to the amount owed plus interest in
cases of a failure to pay a liquidated sum, and (3) the payee's action in having the plaintiff
arrested was an intervening cause and the bank therefore could not be the proximate cause
of the arrest. The case became the leading case for this last proposition, which is discussed
in the text at p. 491 infra.
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stating that the statute covering a bank's liability for the wrongful dishonor
of a check 6 had changed the action from one in contract to one in tort. The
act reads:
No bank shall be liable to a depositor because of the nonpayment through mistake
or error, and without malice, of a check which should have been paid unless the de-
positor shall allege and prove actual damage by reason of such nonpayment and in
such event the liability shall not exceed the amount of damage so proved7
The court interpreted the phrase "actual damage" as an implied mandate
that damages were to be limited only by the tort rule of proximateness.
The statute in question is substantially the same as that proposed by the
American Banker's Association in 1914.8 In the words of the commentator
its purpose was
to correct the unjust rule established by the courts in many states to the effect that
a bank, which refuses to pay the check of a customer who is a merchant or trader and
who has sufficient funds on deposit, is liable to such drawer in an action for substan-
tial damages, without proof of actual damage or any malice on the part of the bank.
.. The courts proceed on the theory that the dishonor of his check must necessarily
result in material injury to such drawer and therefore hold that the law will conclu-
sively presume such to be the fact without the necessity of any proof thereof. But
the fact is often contrary to the presumption. ... [T]he bank ... is often mulcted
in damages out of all proportion to the imaginary injury inflicted .... 9
The presumption which the commentator referred to is similar to that in
libel or slander per se and was created by analogy to the slander of trade
action.' 0
Since the statute was originally sponsored by the American Banker's As-
sociation, the use of it in the Abramowitz case to extend liability was undoubt-
edly not the anticipated consequence. The reason for this anomalous result is
that the draftsman, who intended only to eliminate a presumption of damages,
inadvertently drew the statute so that it could also be read as changing the
elements of damages. A court, in construing the statute, could confine itself,
6 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) § 3320.
SIbid.
8 "No bank or trust company doing business in this State shall be liable to a depositor
because of the non-payment through mistake or error and without malice of a check which
should have been paid unless the depositor shall allege and prove actual damage by reason
of such non-payment and in such event the liability shall not exceed the amount of damage
so proved." I Paton's Digest 1117 (1940).
The statute appears to have been a codification of T. B. Clark Co. v. Mt. Morris Bank,
85 App. Div. 362, 83 N.Y. Supp. 447 (1st Dep't, 1903), aff'd 181 N.Y. 533, 73 N.E. 1133
(1905). Recovery was denied in that case because the dishonor was due to an "inadvert-
ence" on the part of the bookkeeper; the court held that in the absence of malice only
nominal damages can be awarded.
'I Paton's Digest 1117 (1940).
18 Rolin v. Stewart, 14 C.B. 595 (1854).
[Vol. 23
as the California court did, to defining the phrase "actual damages," thereby
changing the type of damages recoverable. This entirely ignores the words
which the draftsman would consider crucial: "allege and prove." The Califor-
nia court's approach was defensible, however, because in that state the liqui-
dated sum rule was followed prior to the passage of the statute" and there-
fore the statute could not be read as intending to eliminate a presumption
of damages.12 Its only possible effect therefore was to cause a departure from
the narrow limits of the liquidated sum rule.
The court then had to decide how far damages should be extended. It had
three alternatives from which 'to choose: (1) ordinary contract damages
measured by foreseeability, (2) slander of credit damages or (3) ordinary
tort damages. The court chose the last alternative; but to understand the full
significance of the decision it is necessary to examine each of the alterna-
tives.13
Some courts have measured damages by the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,'4
i.e., damages reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.' 5 If
'The rule was applied in Hartford v. All Night & Day Bank, 170 Cal. 538, 150 Pac.
356 (1915) ; the statute was passed in 1917, Cal. Stat. (1917) c. 503.
'-In construing the statute other courts have confined their efforts to finding a meaning
of "actual damages" although they were not faced with the situation confronting the Cali-
fornia court. In First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Ducros, 27 Ala. App. 193, 168 So. 704 (1936),
the court decided that "actual" simply meant existent damages and said that the statute
was "but a statutory statement of the broad general rule that a wrongdoer is liable.., for
all the natural and direct or proximate consequences of his wrongful act or omission, and
conversely ... he is liable only for such consequences." Ibid., at 195 and 705. Apparently
it did not occur to the court that the statute was intended to do away with a presumption
of damages because it made reference to the distinction between traders and non-traders.
To avoid such a nullifying interpretation, which was being urged on it by the plaintiff, the
court in Bush v. Southwark Nat'l Bank, 8 Pa. D. & C. 27 (1926), decided that "actual
damages" meant "special damages" as that phrase is used in the law of slander to limit
recovery to pecuniary losses. Consult the text at p. 486 infra.
I The court posed the question as if the only choice were between tort damages and the
liquidated sum rule. Ordinary contract damages were mentioned only in answer to the de-
fendant's contention that the loss of the car was not recoverable. The court, at 896 and
383, said that there is a distinction between contract and tort damages in that in the latter
"damages not even anticipated are recoverable." It did not consider foreseeable damages as
a possible alternative measure, although certainly they too are "actual damages."
1" 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
'E.g., Meyer v. Hudson Trust Co., 181 App. Div. 69, 168 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't,
1917). The New York courts never hesitated to apply to this action a contract rule of dam-
ages other than the liquidated sum rule. This is probably because they consider that the
essence of the bank's obligation is to pay to the order of the depositor. For example in
Burroughs v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 87 Hun (N.Y.) 6, 33 N.Y. Supp. 864 (2d Dep't,
1895), the court said that the contract "is that the bank will hold the funds, and pay them
out according to the order of the depositor." Ibid., at 7 and 865. The use of the liquidated
sum rule in the wrongful dishonor context is probably a result of too strict an application
of the dogma that the relationship between the bank and its depositor is that of debtor
and creditor.
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this rule were realistically applied the results would be no more satisfactory
than those under the liquidated sum rule since the bank generally has no
idea of and no interest in the purposes for which the depositor opens his
account. Even if the rule is misapplied so that the damages reasonably fore-
seeable at the time of dishonor are held to be recoverable the results are not
likely to be materially different.16 At the time of dishonor the bank will not
ordinarily have any more information as to the purposes for which the depos-
itor is using his account than it had at the time the account was opened. Al-
though the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is not generally applied so harshly
that specific injuries must be foreseeable,' 7 it would have to be moderated out
of existence before any damages could be recovered in the wrongful dishonor
cases. The rule is peculiarly unsuitable for institutions which daily make a
great number of impersonal contracts with the public.' 8
It is notable that the California court did not allude to the law of defama-
tion because the historic remedy for the wrongful dishonor of a check has
been an action for "slander of credit." The leading case is Rolin v. Stewart,'9
" In Wahrman v. Bronx County Trust Co., 246 App. Div. 220, 285 N.Y. Supp. 312 (1st
Dep't, 1936), the court, in refusing recovery to the plaintiff who had lost his insurance
policy because of the defendant's wrongful dishonor of his check, said, "it is necessary for
the plaintiff to allege and establish that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge
of the consequences reasonably to be expected from the non-payment of the check. Such
knowledge cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the check was payable to an in-
surance company." Ibid., at 221 and 313. Contra: Roe v. Best, 120 S.W. 2d 819 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1938).
"5 Corbin, Contracts § 1012 (1951).
In other enterprises which deal with large segments of the public, tort damages are
sometimes applied even though the relationship arises out of a contract. For example, in an
action by a passenger against a railroad for injuries suffered because of a negligent breach
of its contract to carry him safely to his destination, the action can sound in tort. Austro-
American S.S. Co. v. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231 (CA. 2d, 1917); 13 C.J.S., Carriers § 640
(1939). This rule was applied with some hesitation and dissension in several earlier cases.
For example in Cincinnati H. & I. R. Co. v. Eaton, 94 Ind. 474 (1883), the court held that
injuries sustained by plaintiff after she had been let off at the wrong station, though too
remote to be recovered in contract, were recoverable in tort because the contract relation-
ship had ended when they passed the station where she should have been let off. The court,
however, cited for authority Brown v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 54 Wis.
342, 11 N.W. 356 (1882), a case similar in facts, but in which the court held the tort meas-
ure of damages applicable without resorting to such technical arguments. Consult also the
dissenting opinion in Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (1883).
Unlike the railroads, the contract measure of damages is applied to telegraph companies
when they negligently fail to deliver a telegram accurately. 86 C.J.S., Telegraphs and Tele-
phones § 208 (1954). But judge Cardozo in Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 245
N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927), indicated some uneasiness with the application of the doc-
trine in this context: "We are not unmindful of the force of the plaintiff's assault upon
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale in its application to the relation between telegraph carrier
and customer. The truth seems to be that neither the clerk who receives the message over
the counter nor the operator who transmits it nor any other employee gives or is expected
to give any thought to the sense of what he is receiving or transmitting. This imparts to
the whole doctrine as to the need for notice an air of unreality." Ibid., at 291 and 142.
- 14 C.B. 595 (1854).
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decided in England in 1854. In that case the declaration stated that the
plaintiffs', whose checks had been dishonored, were "merchants and ship-
owners" and that they had been "greatly injured in their credit and circum-
stances, and were suspected ... to be in bad, failing, and insolvent circum-
stances.12 0 Although no proof of damage was offered the court upheld an in-
struction to the jury that it "should give the plaintiffs such temperate dam-
ages as they should judge to be a reasonable compensation for the injury [the
plaintiffs'] must have sustained from the dishonour of their cheques." 21
The defendant had argued that the action was substantially one in con-
tract, and that since no "special damages" had been proved the plaintiff could
only recover nominal damages. William, J., said that "the fact of his being
in trade stands in the place of special damage." 22 By "special" the court ap-
parently meant damages which had been proved to some degree of certainty.
The case thus stands for the proposition that from the fact of the dishonor
of a trader's check the fact of damage is presumed and the jury is free to
award damages within the general limitations of substantial but temperate
amounts.
28
This decision was the result of a practice which is not common in American
banking-the overdraft as a means of extending credit.24 The court felt that
this system made for a great probability of damages. This is evident from the
" Ibid., at 597. ' Ibid., at 599.
Ibid., at 603.
= There is nothing in the decision to indicate that the presumption thus established was
a conclusive presumption, as the commentary to the Banker's Statute stated. (See text at
p. 482 supra.) On the contrary, the court, in distinguishing an earlier case, Marzetti v.
Williams, 1 B. & Ald. 415 (1830), in which only nominal damages had been given, said that
the check in that case was paid the next day and that it "seems to have been taken for
granted that the plaintiff had sustained no actual damage." This indicates that in English
courts the presumption of damages was rebuttable.
The only case found holding that there is a conclusive presumption of damages is First
Nat'l Bank v. McFall & Co., 144 Ark. 149, 222 S.V. 40 (1920), which is of somewhat doubt-
ful authority. The defendant bank appealed from an award of $500.00 given to a grocer
whose check it had dishonored. The court held the presumption to be conclusive and that
the trial judge correctly refused an instruction that the presumption was rebuttable. It as-
serted that the foundation of the presumption was that damages were usually impossible
to prove. Conversely it was irrebuttable because it was impossible to prove no damages.
But the court in that case had been forced into this unconvincing position by a dissent
written by McCulloch, C.J., in McFall v. First Nat'l Bank of Forest City, 138 Ark. 370,
211 S.W. 919 (1919), where the plaintiff successfully appealed the trial court's refusal of
an instruction on the presumption of damages rule. The dissent insisted that such an in-
struction was a comment on the weight of the evidence which an Arkansas statute pro-
hibited judges from doing. The court when faced with the issue again had to rule that it
was not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law.
" Evitt, Practical Banking 16 (4th ed., 1937). In Thomson v. Nat'l Bank Ltd., 71 Ir.
L.T.R. 142 (1937), the bank dishonored an overdraft and was held liable for injury to
plaintiff's credit as a trader "ensuing upon the dishonour of a comparatively small cheque."
Ibid., at 146.
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language of Lord Tenterden, C.J., in Marzetti v. Williams,25 which was
quoted with approval in the Rolin case: "I cannot forbear to observe, that it
is a discredit to a person, and therefore injurious in fact, to have a draft re-
fused payment for so small a sum, for it shews that the banker had very
little confidence in the customer."26
The court in the Rolin case did not go so far as to say that the remedy for
the wrongful dishonor of a check is an action for slander of trade. It merely
used slander of trade as an analogy to establish a presumption of damages.
Nevertheless, because this was thought of as a slander action, subsequent
American courts adopted other rules of damages from the law of defamation
such as the one that in slander pecuniary damages must be shown if it is not
actionable per se. In ordinary slander this rule has led to harsh results when
strictly applied27 and to inconsistencies when not.28 Efforts to temper the
rule have caused so much uncertainty that it is impossible to define clearly
"pecuniary" loss. 29 Similarly unsatisfactory results have followed from its ap-
plication to the wrongful dishonor cases.
In Bush v. Southwark Nat'l Bank80 the Pennsylvania court, in construing
the Banker's Statute, looked to the law of defamation to find the meaning of
"actual" damages. It decided that it was synonymous with "special damages,"
as that phrase is used in the law of slander and that it meant that only pecu-
niary damages were recoverable. The court reasoned that the action was
originally defamation per se, and that the statute had changed it into simple
slander. Under this theory it refused recovery to a merchant who had shown
impairment of credit, saying that this was only an inconvenience.
The court in the Bush case relied on State Bank of Siloam Springs v. Mar-
shall,3 ' an Arkansas case, for the proposition that damage to credit is only an
inconvenience. Apparently the court did not notice that the court in the
1 B. & Ald. 415 (1830). ' Ibid., at 424.
" In Clark v. Morrison, 80 Ore. 240, 156 Pac. 429 (1916), a demurrer to plaintiff's com-
plaint that the slander had caused her illness resulting in a two week hospitalization was
upheld on the grounds that no "special" damages had been alleged.
I Compare Clark v. Morrison, ibid., with Underhill v. Welton, 32 Vt. 40 (1859), in which
the court held that a claim that due to the distress following the slander the plaintiff suf-
fered loss of time and was "prevented and disabled from pursuing her accustomed duties
and labors with the strength and health that she otherwise would have enjoyed," (ibid.,
at 42) was an allegation of pecuniary loss.
' The Restatement defines pecuniary loss as including harm to property, harm to earn-
ing capacity and the creation of liabilities. Rest., Torts § 906 (1939). The provision allow-
ing injury to earning capacity as a pecuniary loss could be used to extend the number of
actionable slanders. Generally an allegation of mental distress or physical injury by itself
has been held not actionable, Prosser, Torts 806 (1941), but it seems that such injuries
could often be construed as injury to earning capacity.
0 8 Pa. D. & C. 27 (1926).
163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924).
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Marshall case was careful to show that the plaintiff, a boardinghouse keeper,
was not a trader or merchant. The Marshall case contained a dictum to the
effect that if a trader were to show impairment of credit, it would be taken
as proof of pecuniary loss.
Another variation is found in Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter,32 an Arizona
case in which the court was not faced with a statute. It said that the action
was similar to slander and held that the presumption could apply although
the plaintiff was a non-trader. It allowed special damages, attorney's fees
and phone calls, to be added to the general damages to credit, but it refused
damages for mental suffering because recovery was limited to "monetary"
losses. Apparently the court had no doubt that injury to credit was a pecu-
niary loss.
Besides this difficulty resulting from the technicalities of the law of defama-
tion, the modern justifications given for the presumption of damages are
highly questionable. The argument based on the probability of damages is
not so convincing in this country because American banks do not use over-
drafts as a means of extending credit. In England when a check is dishonored
the conclusion is almost inescapable that the bank does not wish to extend the
depositor any credit, or at least any more credit. In the United States the
payee may and may not draw adverse conclusions from the fact of dishonor
for insufficient funds; for example, if he is acquainted with the delays in-
volved in the collection process he may attribute the dishonor, as one possible
explanation at least, to the fact that some items deposited by the drawer may
not yet have cleared. While the probability of substantial injury to a draw-
er's reputation cannot be measured with great accuracy, it would not seem
to be so high as to justify turning the case over to the jury on the mere allega-
tion of dishonor.33
Evidence that some of the courts have lost sight of the probability of dam-
age rationale for the presumption is found in the fact that they have extended
the rule to apply to non-traders as well.34 This extension is justified on the
theory that the ordinary man customarily has a bank account now, whereas
formerly checks were used principally in commerce. This argument is self-
defeating because the smaller the number of non-business accounts there are,
the less pressing is the need to make a distinction, and furthermore the likeli-
hood of extensive damages to a private individual seems far too speculative to
allow the presumption.
8 5
58 Ariz. 491, 121 P. 2d 414 (1942).
"Consult note 43 infra.
Consult, e.g., Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 121 P. 2d 414 (1942); Woody
v. Nat'l Bank of Rocky Mount, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927).
"The presumption relieves the plaintiff of two burdens-the burden of coming forward
with evidence of the fact of damage and of the amount. This is in direct conflict with the
general American doctrine that both the fact and the amount of damages must be proved
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Underlying the presumption of damages rule is the assumption that credit
standing is a matter of hearsay. This is another reason for abandoning the
rule because the fact is that the evaluation of credit standing is now a highly
organized business. Dunne & Bradstreet and the local credit bureau are the
usual sources of information of those faced with a decision involving the
solvency or trustworthiness of a person or firm. In case of a wrongful dis-
honor many adverse effects could generally be stopped by a communication
from the bank to these agencies.
It could be argued that the presumption is necessary since damages are
extremely difficult to prove. This argument has been advanced in defense of
the presumption in defamation per se cases. 36 Injury to credit, however, is
more susceptible to proof than general injury to reputation. For example, it
can be shown, as was done in some cases following the passage of the Ameri-
can Banker's Association statute, that the plaintiff was subsequently refused
credit by people who had formerly extended it to him.37 Although the Bank-
er's Statute is open to criticism in terms of its draftsmanship, the effort to
eliminate the presumption of damages was justified.3 8 Since the slander
to some degree of certainty. McCormick, Damages §§ 25, 26 (1935). On the other hand, in
England the standard is much less stringent: "Questions of certainty, likewise, are sub-
ordinated by the tendency of the English judges to treat the measurement of damages gen-
erally as a matter for the jury's discretion." Ibid., at 98. Consult also Mayne on Damages,
559 (10th ed., 1927).
In the light of this difference in general approach it could be said that although the doc-
trine was a natural development in England, it fits uncomfortably into the American treat-
ment of damages.
' Consult, e.g., Prosser, Torts 808 (1941).
'Bush v. Southwark Nat'l Bank, 8 Pa. D. & C. 27 (1926); State Bank of Siloam
Springs v. Marshall, 163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924).
1 The Uniform Commercial Code has a section which is similar to the Banker's Statute:
"A payor bank is liable to its customer for wrongful dishonor of an item but where the
dishonor occurs through mistake its liability is limited to the actual damages proved in-
cluding damages for any arrest or prosecution of the customer." § 4-402 (Official Draft,
1952). The comment specifically refuses to set forth a theory of the action, but an analysis
of the statute together with the comment demonstrates that its effect should be the same
as that proposed in the text, i.e., the action should be treated as a tort independent of con-
tract or defamation rules.
The comment states that it is intended to end the presumption of damages based on the
defamation per se theory. Now if, in spite of this, the action were still to be treated as a
defamation action, then pecuniary loss would have to be alleged and proved before any
non-pecuniary losses were allowed because such losses are only allowed as "parasitic" dam-
ages to the pecuniary damages. Prosser, Torts 806 (1941). But arrest and prosecution are
not pecuniary losses and the statute specifically provides for their recovery and implies
that other non-pecuniary losses are also recoverable.
The statement that a bank's "liability is limited to actual damages proved" suggests that
there are no other limits besides the necessary one of proximateness. In other words, the
limitation set forth is exhaustive and by implication excludes such limitations as are im-
posed by contract principles, i.e., the requirements that the injury must be foreseeable or
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analogy was originally used only to create the presumption, there is no reason
that the archaic rules of defamation should survive the presumption."9 If they
do there is a shift from one extreme to another: if the presumption is applied
the plaintiff is relieved of all burdens in relation to damages; on the other
hand if the action continues to be treated as slander when the presumption is
dropped, the plaintiff must undertake the onerous burden of proving pecu-
niary loss.
40
the natural consequence of the wrong. (Note that this argument also rejects the defamation
requirement that the loss must be pecuniary.)
Another argument can be made against a contract theory of damages based again on the
fact that damages f9r arrest or prosecution are specifically allowed even in cases where the
dishonor was due to a mistake and therefore was not malicious. The essence of these in-
juries is mental suffering and ordinarily mental suffering is not a compensable injury in a
suit for breach of contract unless the breach was malicious. Consult Rest., Contracts § 341
(1932).
The provision which limits liability only if the dishonor is due to mistake, is comparable
to that in the A.B.A. statute limiting it only when it occurs through "mistake or error,
and without malice" (note 8 supra). It is generally considered a "mistake" when through
a bookkeeping error the check is dishonored; it is not a "mistake" if the bank refuses to
honor the check because of an adverse claim, Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230
N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921), or because it thinks it has a claim on the deposit, Jones v.
Citizen's Bank of Clovis, 58 N.M. 48, 265 P. 2d 366 (1954). This seems to indicate that
the difference is between dishonor occurring through negligence and dishonor because of a
mistake of law as to the bank's rights. But cf. Gonsalves v.'Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d
169, 105 P. 2d 118 (1940). It seems that the use of the word "negligence" would have been
preferable to "mistake," although the idea of a bank trying to prove that it was negligent
to limit its liability seems anomalous.
It is questionable, however, whether the distinction should be made at all, especially
when the bank is faced with an adverse claim. In this situation, if there is no adverse claim
statute, the bank is liable to the claimant if it honors the check and the claim turns out
to be valid; on the other hand, if it dishonors any checks and the claims are not valid, it
is liable to the depositor for wilful dishonor. It is understandable why the draftsman
wanted to prevent banks from claiming deposits with impunity, but for this purpose puni-
tive damages would seem more appropriate. The distinction is further questionable because
in case of a "wilful" dishonor both the code and the statute leave the parties to their
common-law remedies which vary in different states. For example, not all states allow the
presumption of damages to work in favor of both traders and non-traders. In a jurisdiction
like California, where the liquidated sum rule was the law before the Banker's statute, the
court could not return to its common-law rule since it would then have to allow less dam-
ages for willful dishonor than for an inadvertent dishonor. The distinction would thus com-
pel the court, in willful dishonor cases, to choose one of the various rules as to the presump-
tion of damages.
,This requirement of a pecuniary loss is a result of a jurisdictional dispute between the
ecclesiastical and the common-law courts. The latter, in order to show that they were limit-
ing themselves to temporal affairs, required a showing of pecuniary loss. The Pre-Thorley
v. Kerry Case Law of the Libel-Slander Distinction, 23 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 132, 134-36
(1955).
"Even if the damage alleged in a complaint is injury to reputation or credit it is not
necessary to apply the rules of defamation. Since this is basically a contract, no tort dam-
ages need to be allowed at all, and if for special reasons the courts decide to allow them
they should be free to frame an action which will best satisfy those reasons and not be
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In view of the harshness or inconsistency resulting from either a contract
measure of damages or the defamation rules, the court's decision in the
Abramowitz case to treat this as a tort sui generis seems to be a wise one.
The court's decision on this point was so unequivocal that it suggests a de-
liberate attempt to rid the action of any vestiges of slander or contract rules.
This decisiveness is desirable because in several prior cases the courts have
shown a lack of precision in the use of the proximate cause measure of dam-
ages. The uncertainty as to the nature of the wrongful dishonor action has
undoubtedly contributed to this imprecision. Thus some courts, while ostensi-
bly allowing a tort remedy- have eliminated what were clearly proximate ele-
ments of damages.
This is best illustrated by the cases which held that damages for arrest
following dishonor are not recoverable because, as a matter of law, they are
not the proximate result of the bank's action.41 The reason generally given for
this result is that the action of the payee is an intervening cause because it is
so unlikely that he would swear out a warrant without further inquiry.
42
Since issuing a bad check is a crime, it is rather surprising to find the courts
holding that arrest following the crime is so improbable that it is not even a
question for the jury.43
If the action is clearly defined as a tort there is little doubt that the courts
would at least leave the question of proximateness to the jury.44 This was the
forced into common-law, categories. Injury to reputation, like any other injury, should be
compensable but not subject to any special rules.
The courts, following the Rolin case, have in one sense ignored the proper defamation
categories. Many of the cases for wrongful dishonor involve all the elements necessary for
a libel action, because generally the bank writes or stamps something on the check. How-
ever, with the exception of the recent case of Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 200
Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 264 (S.Ct., 1951), it has never been held to constitute a libel. Since
in libel actions there is a presumption of damages, this decision would vitiate the prevailing
New York doctrine that in the absence of malice there is no presumption of damages in
wrongful dishonor actions. The significance of the case has apparently gone unnoticed.
"Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie, 220 Mo. App. 165, 281 S.W. 130 (1926) ; Hartford v. All
Night & Day Bank, 170 Cal. 538, 150 Pac. 356 (1915).
"Ibid.
Furthermore it is a question of fact on which there is room for sharp division of opinion.
For example, in Bearden v. Bank of Italy, 57 Cal. App. 377, 207 Pac. 270 (1922), the court
said that "the issuance of a check.. . without funds or credit to meet it is a public offense
which notoriously frequently results in the arrest and imprisonment of the drawer of the
check." Ibid., at 378 and 270.
It seems to be, at least indirectly, a contradiction to maintain that arrest following dis-
honor is somewhat likely after concluding earlier that injury to credit from the dishonor
of a check is not too probable. Consult text supra. The explanation is that in neither case
is the conclusioh as to probability in absolute terms-it is simply that both are proper
questions for the jury because in neither case is the injury so likely or unlikely that it
should be treated as a question of law.
"The Uniform Commercial Code appears to adopt a third solution which is to hold that
as a matter of law dishonor is the proximate cause of arrest. § 4-402 (Official Draft, 1952) ;
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thought of the court in the Abramowitz case when it rejected the holding of
Hartford v. All Night & Day Bank45 that an arrest was not the proximate
result of a dishonor. The court stated that apparently the Hartford case "as-
sumed that the action before it was one in contract.""0 In other words, when
a court treats the action entirely as a tort, it must conclude that the arrest
was or could be the proximate result of the dishonor. This is supported by the
fact that the courts which have treated the action as one entirely in tort have
left this question to the jury.47
The use of the independent tort measure of damages is also desirable be-
cause it harmonizes with the theory that the banks are under a public duty
to honor checks drawn against sufficient accounts. This theory was first ex-
pounded in Patterson v. Marine Nat'l Bank,48 decided in Pennsylvania in
1889. In that case the court stated that the ordinary rules of contracts should
not be applied because:
A bank is an institution of a quasi public character. It is chartered by the government
for the purpose, inter alia, of holding and safely keeping the moneys of individuals
and corporations.... Individual and corporate business could hardly exist for a day
without banking facilities. At the same time, the business of the community would be
at the mercy of banks if they could at their pleasure refuse to honor their depositors'
checks, and then claim that such action was the mere breach of an ordinary contract
for which only nominal damages could be recovered, unless special damages were
proved. There is something more than a breach of contract in such cases.
49
consult note 38 supra. But varying circumstances may make this result inequitable also;
for example, it might be shown that the payee's action was motivated by personal animosity.
170 Cal. 538, 150 Pac. 356 (1915).
'
4 Abramowitz v. Bank of America, 131 Cal. App. 2d 892, 897, 281 P. 2d 380, 383 (Super.
Ct., 1955).
' Collins v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Danbury, 131 Conn. 167,38 A. 2d 582 (1944);
Mouse v. Central Savings & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929). These courts
phrased the issue in terms of whether or not the bank's negligence was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's arrest.
It has never been held that negligence must be established in order to recover, although
the Collins case contained a dictum to this effect. The necessity of proving negligence could
probably be avoided by the use of res ipsa loquitur. This theory is used in actions against
telegraph companies for failing to transmit or deliver a message properly. Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Citizen's Bank of Harrison, 144 Ark. 577, 223 S.W. 29 (1920).
The more important question is whether due care, good faith or contributory negligence
should be defenses. In the Collins case it was intimated that contributory negligence would
be a defense. Contra: Weaver v. Grenada Bank, 180 Miss. 876, 179 So. 564 (1938) (the
comparative negligence statute was held inapplicable). See also Johnson v. Nat'l Bank of
S.C. of Sumpter, 213 S.C. 458, 50 S.E. 2d 177 (1948). Such defenses should not be allowed.
Since the deposit arises out of a contract relationship the situations which might give rise
to a plea of contributory negligence (for instance, where the plaintiff had failed to send in
his signature card) can be dealt with in terms of conditions precedent to the duty to honor
the check.
" 130 Pa. 419, 18 Atl. 632 (1889). 10 Ibid., at 433 and 633.
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A difference in emphasis can be seen between this case and the Rolin case.
The English judges were concerned with the plight of the individual depositor
because damage to his credit was so likely under their system, whereas the
court in the Patterson case emphasized the public character of the bank and
the need of greater liability as a means of coitrol.
The Pennsylvania court, however, did not adopt the independent tort
theory of damages. It advanced the public policy argument only to justify its
use of the presumption of damages. But if the bank is under a public duty to
honor checks, a failure to do so is a tort for which any proximate injury
should be compensated. 50 The defamation rules therefore should have no
special application. This result was reached in the subsequent Kentucky case
of American Nat'l Bank v. Morey,5 1 where the court, after quoting the
above passage from the Patterson case, said that the action had no name and
that it:
rests upon the ground that the bank is charged by law with certain duties, and that
for a breach of these duties it is liable to the party injured for the damages done him.
The measure of these damages is the same as in the case of the breach of other duties
imposed by law.52
Not only is the independent tort theory a logical development of the public-
duty doctrine, it also provides the best measure of damages insofar as the
basis of that doctrine is a desire to discipline the banks. We have seen that
the contract or foreseeability measure would provide no measure of control if
correctly applied. Similarly, the rule of slander, that pecuniary loss must be
shown, leads to harsh and inconsistent results. On the other hand, the pre-
sumption of damages is not desirable although it leads to an extension of
damages. It has no justification in the modern American banking system, and
it probably leads to awards beyond the injury sustained. As a means of con-
trol it is arbitrary, and since banks generally show a high degree of care al-
ready, there is no need to go beyond strictly compensatory damages.
Probably the idea of the check as cash lies behind this public-duty argu-
ment with its use of extended liability as a means of disciplining the banks
for dishonoring checks.53 Deposit currency and checks are at the center of
' Of course the enforcement of all contracts is a matter of public policy. The difference
is that society has a greater interest in the proper performance of certain contracts than it
has in others. Whenever the legislature decrees by a statute that society has a special inter-
est in a contract the courts impose tort liability. For example, in Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Green, 153 Tenn. 59, 281 S.W. 778 (1926), the court held that a statute to the effect that
telegraph messages should be delivered correctly and promptly had changed the measure of
damages from that of contract to that of tort. Similarly the courts themselves can decide
that society has a peculiar interest in a certain type of contract and extend damages from
that of contract to that of tort on the basis of public policy.
- 113 Ky. 857, 69 S.W. 759 (1902). Ibid., at 864 and 760.
' That it is the community's reliance on checks as currency which the courts are probably
protecting is shown by the fact that they do not hold the banks liable in tort for every in-
[Vol. 23
our financial system, and the prompt honoring of checks with the resulting
reliance on them is necessary to its proper functioning. The public enjoys
the convenience, but the banker makes the profit from this arrangement. He
encourages this reliance on checks as cash, so there is nothing strange about
putting on him the burden of all the injuries which grow out of this reliance
and are caused by his negligence or deliberate dishonors which turn out to be
wrongful because he mistook his rights. He is the center of this currency sys-
tem, profits from it and is in a position to distribute the losses.
If there is a well-defined policy of holding the banks liable for all of the
proximate injuries resulting from a wrongful dishonor, as there is under the
Abramowitz case, the public can put an even stronger reliance on checks-
which is to the benefit of the community at large, and in the long run, to the
bankers.
jury which the depositor suffers. In Stella Flour & Feed Corp. v. Nat'l City Bank, 285 App.
Div. 182, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (1st Dep't, 1954), the plaintiff sued for damages to business
and credit suffered as a result of his account being depleted by the bank's negligence in
cashing checks on which the payees' names had been changed. The complaint was dismissed
on the grounds that to grant tort damages would be pushing responsibility beyond the point
where commercial and banking people thought it ended. Cf. Abate v. Bushwick Savings
Bank, 207 Misc. 372, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 140 (N.Y. City Ct., 1955).
Furthermore, one cannot avoid the liquidated sum rule by making checks out to oneself
and presenting them at the bank. In Kinlan v. Ulster Bank, Ltd. [1928] Ir. Rep. 171, the
plaintiff had attempted to draw on his account by presenting checks made out to himself.
In reply to his suit for wrongful dishonor the court said, "the cause of action on the facts
is not the wrongful dishonouring of the plaintiff's cheques, but the wrongful refusal to an-
swer his demand for payment to him out of the moneys standing to the credit of his account.
From this point of view, the fact that he produced cheque forms ... is practically imma-
terial." Ibid., at 182.
The requirement that there be a third party payee automatically limits recovery to situ-
ations where the money was intended for a specific purpose. Otherwise the bank would be
liable for all of the speculative losses which might be sustained through a lack of funds.
Since these losses would be determined by the depositor's testimony as to how he intended
to use his money, the action would encourage speculation and fraud. But compare Jones v.
Citizen's Bank of Clovis, 58 N.M. 48, 265 P. 2d 366 (1954). This was an action by an ad-
ministratrix for loss of credit and mental anxiety leading to the depositor's death. In de-
ciding that a physician's testimony was admissible the court related how the decedent,
through lack of funds, was forced to sell his furniture, that his wife had to work, and he
could not pay his hospital bills. The court thus improperly merged the damage from lack of
funds with those arising directly from the dishonor.
STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER'S LIABILITY TO
CUSTOMER OF OUTSIDE BROKER
It is settled law that when a person engages another to transact business
for him on a particular market the business will be conducted according to
any established custom and usage of that market, whether or not the person
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